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Chapter 8 
 
You’re So Vain, I’ll Bet You Think This Song Is about You1 
 
[E]ach generation gets the past it deserves. 
—Grant Gilmore2 
 The new orthodoxy of abortion history has it that the nineteenth-century legislatures debated 
the frequent statutory enactments in various states throughout the century that steadily closed 
gaps and fissures in the laws prohibiting abortions3 primarily as a form of medical regulation.4 
The new orthodoxy also raises anti-foreign feeling, verging (among other prejudices) on anti-
Semitism, as a major motive for the anti-abortion crusade of the late-nineteenth century.5 Those 
who expound the new orthodoxy dismiss any professed concern of the leaders of the anti-
                                                 
1 Carly Simon, You’re So Vain (1972). 
2 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1977). 
3 See Chapter 7, at notes 3-28. 
4 See, e.g., JAMES MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, 
at 119, 202 (1978). See generally Chapters 6 & 7. 
5 ELLEN CHESLER, WOMEN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT 60 (1992); DAVID 
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 17, 96, 107-08, 129 
(2nd ed. 1998); FAYE GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY 32 
(1989); LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 
140-42, 236-45 (1976); MARK GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRO-
DUCTIVE POLITICS 24 (1996); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 170-71 (1985); DONALD JUDGES, HARD CHOICES, LOST VOICES 104 (1993); KRISTIN 
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 27-28 (1984); MOHR, supra note 4, at 91-93, 180, 207-09; 
ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMEN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
FREEDOM 77-79, 82-89, 93-94, 116-25, 129-30 (rev. ed. 1990); CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CON-
DUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 224-28, 238 (1985); Jeannie Rosoff, “The Politics of Birth Con-
trol,” 20 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 312, 313 (1988); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Per-
spective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 297-300 (1992).  
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abortion campaign for other values—such as the protection of fetal life,6 the protection of the life 
or health of mothers,7 or the protection of public morality8—as at best a mere “moral prejudice”9 
and at worst a subterfuge necessary to enlist others in the physicians’ anticompetitive cam-
paign.10 Only an occasional pro-abortion historian are more candid, admitting that virtually all 
the discussion of abortion in medical and other literature in the nineteenth century stressed the 
protection of fetal life (often even labeling the crime as “foeticide”), with other reasons being 
mentioned, if at all, merely in passing.11 
 The new orthodoxy holds that the public in general, and women in particular, were either 
duped or disregarded in the efforts of the allopathic physicians to gain economic control over the 
birthing process. The allopaths supposedly used abortion as a weapon to drive out the competi-
tion, particularly midwives. The historians of the new orthodoxy offer no direct evidence of such 
an allopathic conspiracy, substituting conjecture about the motives of individuals and groups. 
These conjectures do not hold up when one examines the evidence offered to support them.12 
Completely absent from the new orthodoxy is any sense of change in the methods or techniques 
by which abortions were performed,13 yet these changes were central to professional responses to 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 4, at 87, 104, 110-11, 140, 143, 152-53, 156-59, 164-66, 207, 214, 216-17.  
7 Id. at 120-22, 125-29, 207, 254-55. 
8 Id. at 88-89, 131, 141-42, 163-66, 207-08, 214, 216-17, 238.  
9 Id. at 140, 143-44, 147-54, 164-70, 196-99, 219-21, 238, 261-63, 307 n.69.  
10 Id. at 134-35, 159-64, 220-21, 224-26, 228-29, 237-39, 244-45, 255-60. See also SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 
5, at 236-44. 
11 See, e.g., CARL DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRE-
SENT 241 (1980).  
12 See Chapter 6, at notes 213-331, and Chapter 7, at notes 205-470. 
13 See Chapter 6, at notes 332-413, and Chapter 7, at notes 114-60. 
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abortion throughout the nineteenth century. Nor does the new orthodoxy adequately address the 
role of women relative to abortion in the nineteenth century. 
 Historians of the new orthodoxy, particularly those who describe themselves as feminists, 
tend to project their notions of what women feel and think today onto women of the past, par-
ticularly American women of the nineteenth century. Such projections, often enough question-
able regarding women the late twentieth century, are wholly insupportable for women in the late 
nineteenth century. Even James Mohr, intent as he was to demonstrate that the criminalization of 
abortion was an imposition by a medical conspiracy against society, cited a great deal of evi-
dence of a broad social consensus in favor of the criminalization of abortion—including the near 
unanimous strong condemnation of abortion by nineteenth-century feminists. Mohr was reduced 
to describing the feminist attitudes towards abortion as “an anomaly.”14 
 The historical record is clear. Only by impugning the integrity of innumerable social and 
professional leaders can one argue that protection of unborn children from the rising numbers of 
abortions was not a significant concern. Even charges of insincerity hardly explain the attitude of 
the nineteenth century feminists. Their attitude also belies the claims in the two so-called Histo-
rians’ Briefs15 that nineteenth-century abortion statutes were adopted by men in order to oppress 
women—in struggles between doctors and midwives for markets, or between husbands and 
                                                 
14 MOHR, supra note 4, at 113.  
15 Amicus Brief of 250 American Historians in support of Appellants in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, [505 U.S. 833 (1992)], at 11-21 (“Casey Historians’ Brief”); Amicus Brief of 281 American His-
torians supporting Appellees in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services [492 U.S. 490 (1989)] (“Webster Histori-
ans’ Brief”), reprinted at 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. RPTR. 163, 173-77 (1989), and in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: WEBSTER v. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 107 (Roy Mer-
sky & Gary Hartman eds. 1990) (“DOCUMENTARY HISTORY”) (hereafter pagination will be given only to the version 
in the Women’s Rts. L. Rptr.). 
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wives for dominance in the home, or of men to use women to prevent “race suicide.”16 It is par-
ticularly important to discover what stand the emerging women’s movement (the “first wave of 
feminism”) took on these matters. 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY FEMINISTS 
Our similarities are different. 
—Dale Berra17 
 The later nineteenth century was an era in which sexual roles were heavily contested. Grow-
ing numbers of women sought to enter what many considered to be “male” occupations, includ-
ing medicine and law. Often men in those lines of work succeeded in organizing themselves to 
exclude women. This effort was largely successful in excluding women from the law; a few 
women fought stubbornly and eventually successfully to enter the profession against claims that 
women were inherently unsuited for such work.18 Women were also largely excluded from the 
dominant (allopathic) medical profession at this time.19 The women who fought these battles 
were among the feminist leaders and organizers of the later nineteenth century, the so-called 
“first wave” of feminism.20 Most of these women generally were neither lawyers nor physicians 
                                                 
16 See the text infra at notes 164-69; and Chapter 9, at 36-43; Chapter 11, at notes 5-24. 
17 DAVID NATHAN, BASEBALL QUOTATIONS 153 (1993). 
18 See Chapter 9, at notes 233-329. 
19 See Chapter 6, at notes 213-67, Chapter 7, at notes 394-439, and infra, at notes 253-308. 
20 On the use of this expression, see CASSANDRA LANGER, A FEMINIST CRITIQUE: HOW FEMINISM HAS CHANGED 
AMERICAN SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND HOW WE LIVE FROM THE 1940S TO THE PRESENT 6 (1996). See generally BAR-
BARA BERG, THE REMEMBERED GATE: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM (1978); CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTIE 
ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS (1969); WILLIAM HENRY CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER 
CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970 (1972); CATHERINE CLINTON, THE OTHER CIVIL 
WAR: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1984); DEGLER, supra note 11, at 328-61; ELLEN CAROL 
DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-
1869 (1978); ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, HARRIOT STANTON BLATCH AND THE WINNING OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (1997); 
ELEANOR FLEXNER, A CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 
1975); DOLORES HAYDEN, THE GRAND DOMESTIC REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF FEMINIST DESIGNS FOR AMERICAN 
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and they were not representative of the hypothetical “average” woman of the time. The feminist 
leaders represent thoughtful and articulate women of the time. This section examines their atti-
tudes, later sections of this chapter examining the specific experiences and attitudes of women 
physicians. The next chapter examines the specific experiences and attitudes of women lawyers. 
 Today it is fashionable for pro-abortion historians and lawyers to assert that the late nine-
teenth century feminists supported abortion rights and were simply unable to overcome the sexist 
oppression of the time to secure these rights for their sisters.21 Several hundred historians signed 
a brief for the Supreme Court making just such an assertion,22 while in an earlier brief these 
same historians asserted that the nineteenth century abortion statutes resulted from a male con-
spiracy to oppress women.23 Nothing could be further from the truth. Historian Estelle Freed-
man, who co-authored one of the leading histories of sexual practices in America,24 candidly ac-
                                                                                                                                                             
HOMES, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CITIES (1981); AILEEN KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVE-
MENT: 1890-1920 (1971); SUZANNE MARILLEY, WOMEN SUFFRAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1820-1920 (1996); LOUISE MICHELE NEWMANN, MEN’S IDEAS/WOMEN’S REALITIES (1985); WIL-
LIAM O’NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: A HISTORY OF FEMINISM IN AMERICA (1969); DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE 
AND GENDER 12-50 (1989); ANNE & ANDREW SCOTT, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN SUFFRAGE 
(1975); ANDREW SINCLAIR, THE BETTER HALF: THE EMANCIPATION OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN (1966); THE SE-
LECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY VOLUME ONE: THE SCHOOL OF ANTI-
SLAVERY (Ann Gordon ed. 1997); REAY TANNAHILL, SEX IN HISTORY 388-402 (1980); NANCY WOLOCH, WOMEN 
AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1984). 
21 See JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA xii 41-44, 253-
72, 275-80 (1994); BARBARA BROOKES, ABORTION IN ENGLAND 1900-1967, at 2-7, 14, 40, 57, 63-67, 70-71, 79-88, 
105-06, 113-17 (1988); GORDON, supra note 5, at 97-111; GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 155-95; BEVERLY 
WILDUNG HARRISON, OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE: TOWARD A NEW ETHIC OF ABORTION 161-72 (1983); PETCHESKY, 
supra note 5, at 45-46, 54-56, 67-73, 82-84, 89-90, 188-92; LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: 
WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 11-12 (1997); JAMES REED, FROM PRIVATE 
VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE: THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1830, at 34-35 (1978); 
RHODE, supra note 20, at 202; SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 220-525; Rachael Pine & Sylvia Law, Envision-
ing a Future for Reproductive Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 455 
n.219 (1992); Siegel, supra note 5, at 294-95, 302-14. 
22 Casey Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 18-20, & App. at 6. 
23 Webster Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 173-77. 
24 See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 67 
(1988). 
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knowledged that she signed the first brief even though it contradicts the history of women as she 
has found it.25 Other historians signed those briefs without even reading them.26 The briefs are 
more of a political manifesto than a serious attempt to develop the history of abortion in the 
United States. 
 Feminism was a major political and social force from the middle of the nineteenth century 
onward in the United States, its influence declining only in the middle years of the twentieth cen-
tury.27 Yet the feminists did not stand apart from the emerging scientific knowledge of their time. 
Indeed, perhaps the most impressive demonstration of the new consensus on the nature of human 
gestation28 was its emphatic embrace by all leading feminists during the period when the abor-
tion statutes were being enacted. Feminist leaders, as a result, were explicit and uncompromis-
ing, and virtually unanimous, in condemning abortion as “ante-natal murder,” “child-murder,” or 
“ante-natal infanticide.”29 
 Explaining the underlying motives of the early feminists in opposing abortion is no easier 
than it is for others who opposed abortion during that time. While the leading feminists of the 
                                                 
25 Estelle Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy: Rethinking the Webster Amicus Brief, 12 PUB. 
HISTORIAN 27, 28-30. See Chapter 17, at notes 48-51. See also Chapter 17, at notes 52-66. 
26 See Remarks of Professor Joan Hollinger, AALS 1990 Conference Audio Tape No. 163 (available from Recorded 
Resources Corporation of Millersville, Md.) (proudly reciting how she personally recruited 38 members of the His-
tory Department at the University of Michigan to sign the Webster Historians’ Brief—all signing without having 
read the brief they were subscribing to, let alone a brief on the other side).  
27 See the authorities collected supra at note 20. 
28 See Chapter 5, at notes 209-46. 
29 See, e.g., EMMA DRAKE, WHAT A YOUNG WIFE OUGHT TO KNOW 130 (1901); ELIZA BISBEE DUFFEY, THE RELA-
TIONS OF THE SEXES 274-75 (1876); ALICE BUNKER STOCKHAM, TOKOLOGY 246-50 (1887); Susan B. Anthony, 
Marriage and Maternity, THE REVOLUTION, July 8, 1869, at 4; Ann Densmore, Lectures, THE REVOLUTION, Mar. 
19, 1868, at 170; Matilda Gage, Is Woman Her Own?, THE REVOLUTION, April 9, 1868, at 215-16; Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Child Murder, THE REVOLUTION, March 12, 1868, at 146-47. See generally D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra 
note 24, at 64; MARY KRANE DERR, MAN’S INHUMANITY TO WOMAN MAKES COUNTLESS INFANTS DIE (1991); 
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nineteenth century were rebelling in so many ways against the social conventions of the time, 
they were by no means free of those conventions. Some of the leading feminists of the time were 
notoriously racist, arguing that women should have the vote as a bulwark against the “brutish 
and ignorant Negro.”30 Such feminists might have opposed abortion out of fears of race sui-
cide,31 although no one has come forward with direct evidence of this motive among feminists. 
There might have been other unsavory motives for feminist opposition to abortion. But at least in 
part feminist opposition to abortion arose from a desire to protect women against the depreda-
tions of men. And regardless of what the motivations were, if the feminists and ordinary women 
all strongly opposed abortion, along with most men in society, the nineteenth century laws repre-
sented a clear social consensus regardless of the underlying motivations, and not simply a male 
conspiracy against women. 
 The authors of the Casey Historians’ Brief would have us see early feminist opposition to 
abortion as based on Victorian hostility to sexuality or to “male license.”32 They mischaracterize 
the nineteenth-century feminist position on abortion as one of reluctance rather than opposition 
and attempted to conflate historical opposition to abortion with historical opposition to contra-
ception.33 The authors even claimed in that brief that the spousal notice requirement held uncon-
                                                                                                                                                             
GORDON, supra note 5, at 129; MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN ENG-
LAND, 1850-1895, at 87-93 (1989). 
30 See, e.g., Ida Husted Harper, Would Woman Suffrage Benefit the State, and Woman Herself?, 178 N. AM. REV. 
362, 373 (1904). See generally BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 130-31, 161-
65 (1989); TANNAHILL, supra note 78, at 400; Deborah Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist Challenges 
and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1741-42 (1991).  
31 On the prominence of fears of race suicide among some opponents of abortion, see the text infra at notes 164-69; 
and Chapter 9, at 36-43; Chapter 11, at notes 5-24. 
32 Casey Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 18-19. 
33 Id. at 18-20.  
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stitutional in the Casey decision34 was designed to carry forward the common-law tradition of 
subordination of a woman to her husband’s control.35 No one disputes that such traditions ex-
isted, and few would support those traditions as legal mandates today. Whether those traditions 
are relevant to the abortion controversy is another question. The answer is suggested by the fact 
that the same authors omitted any mention of nineteenth-century feminists in their earlier Web-
ster Historians’ Brief because it was simply too embarrassing for their argument.36  
 Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton both spoke in terms of child murder.37 To 
argue, as the authors of the Casey Historians’ Brief do,38 that such the nineteenth-century femi-
nists’ were merely seeking to protect women from exploitation by men and were not morally op-
posed to abortion is, at best, to focus narrowly on their stated goals to the exclusion of both how 
they explained their positions and what they themselves understood to be the practical effects of 
their efforts. Such women as Anthony and Stanton were hardly afraid of confronting male opin-
ions on questions of basic morality. Numerous early feminists were actively engaged in working 
for the abolition of slavery, the imposition of temperance, and reforming of prisons as well as for 
development of women’s rights.39 Both Anthony and Stanton publicly abandoned the religions in 
                                                 
34 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 911-22 (Stevens, J., partially concur-
ring), 922-43 (Blackmun, J., partially concurring).  
35 Casey Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 17. 
36 Sylvia Law, Conversations between Historians and the Constitution, 12 THE PUB. HISTORIAN 11, 15 (1990) (Syl-
via Law was the principal author of the Historians’ Briefs). 
37 See Anthony, supra note 29; Stanton, supra note 29. See also DERR, supra note 29, at 24; ELIZABETH GRIFFITH, 
IN HER OWN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON 133 (1984). 
38 Casey Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 19. 
39 Such wide-ranging activism had deep roots going back to Quaker women before the American Revolution. See 
REBECCA LARSON, DAUGHTERS OF LIGHT: QUAKER WOMEN PREACHING AND PROPHESYING IN THE COLONIES AND 
ABROAD, 1700-1775, at 94, 182, 185, 292-95, 302-03 (1999). See also JULIE ROY JEFFREY, THE GREAT SILENT 
ARMY OF ABOLITIONISM: ORDINARY WOMEN IN THE ANTISLAVERY MOVEMENT (1998); KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, 
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which they were raised, and Stanton published her own feminist version of the Bible.40 Stanton 
did so at a time when women, still excluded from formal political power, were a growing influ-
ence in mainstream Protestantism.41 Stanton, like Anthony, was a figure of international stature 
who strongly influence English suffragists as well as American, and had connections with suf-
fragists in other European and Europeanized countries.42 These were hardly women who backed 
off from an argument that they considered essential to women’s lives because of fear of men’s 
opinions. 
 Contemporary historians go further, conflating attitudes towards abortion and contraception 
in the nineteenth century.43 This goes beyond merely draining the color out of our pictures of the 
past; it smacks of deliberate obfuscation. Some anti-feminists of the time did link abortion and 
                                                                                                                                                             
WOMEN’S RIGHTS EMERGE WITHIN THE ANTISLAVERY MOVEMENT, 1830-1870 (2000). On the radicalism and influ-
ence of feminists in Europe on feminists in the United States, see BONNIE ANDERSON, JOYOUS GREETINGS: THE 
FIRST INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 1830-1860 (2000). 
40 ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, THE WOMAN’S BIBLE (1895).  
41 See ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION (1977); SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 129-
64. 
42 See ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE: REMINISCENCES, 1815-1897 (1898); Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Declaration of Sentiments, reprinted in MARI JO & PAUL BUHLE, THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUF-
FRAGE: SELECTIONS FROM THE CLASSIC WORK OF STANTON, ANTHONY, GAGE, AND HARPER 94-95 (1978). See also 
GRIFFITH, supra note 37; ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AS REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY AND REMINISCENCES 
(Theodore Stanton & Harriet Stanton Black eds. 1922); Sandra Stanley Holton, From Anti-Slavery to Suffrage Mili-
tancy: The Bright Circle, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the British Women’s Movement, in SUFFRAGE AND BEYOND: 
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 213 (Caroline Daley & Melanie Nolan eds. 1994). 
43 See, e.g., DEGLER, supra note 11, at 202-06, 215; HARRISON, supra note 21, at 161-72; RHODE, supra note 20, at 
202; SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 220; PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 25-35; Linda Gordon, Voluntary Moth-
erhood: The Beginnings of Feminist Birth Control Ideas in the United States, 1 FEM. STUD. 5 (1973) (“Gordon, Vol-
untary Motherhood”) (this became ch. 5 in GORDON, supra note 5); Linda Gordon, Why Nineteenth Century Femi-
nists Did Not Support “Birth Control” and Twentieth Century Feminists Do, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY 40 (Barrie 
Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds. 1982) (“Gordon, Nineteenth Century Feminists”). This conflation pervades Gordon’s 
major work. GORDON, supra note 5. 
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contraception and blamed both on feminism.44 One need look no further than the very nine-
teenth-century feminists that the authors of the Casey Historians’ Brief discuss in claiming that 
such feminists opposed the abortion statutes45 to discover that nineteenth-century feminists 
themselves distinguished sharply between the two practices, frequently and adamantly condemn-
ing abortion while supporting contraception.46 Nineteenth century courts and legislatures also 
distinguished between abortion (a crime everywhere) and the use of contraceptives (a crime only 
in Connecticut).47 Many male physicians of the time drew the same distinction.48 Some anti-
feminist moralists did condemn abortion and contraception in similar terms in the nineteenth 
century.49 As Michael Grossberg noted, however, “they reserved their harshest condemnations 
and most zealous efforts for the antiabortion crusade.”50 Perhaps some men who supported the 
feminists also condemned contraception equally with abortion, but the principal example of 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., H.S. POMEROY, THE ETHICS OF MARRIAGE 95-96 (1888); Montrose Pallen, Foeticide, 3 MED. ARCHIVES 
(St. L. n.s.) 195, 205-06 (1869). MOHR, supra note 4, at 107-08; MARY ROTH WALSH, DOCTORS WANTED: NO 
WOMEN NEED APPLY 145-46 (1977).  
45 Casey Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 18-20. 
46 See, e.g., ANNIE BESANT, THE LAW OF POPULATION: ITS CONSEQUENCES, AND ITS BEARING UPON HUMAN CON-
DUCT AND MORALS (1878). See generally D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 50-63, 64-65; GROSSBERG, 
supra note 5, at 169-70. 
47 Commonwealth v. Leigh, 15 PHILA. R. 376 (1881). 
48 BRODIE, supra note 21, at 275-78. 
49 See, e.g., AUGUSTUS GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE LAWS OF LIFE AND HEALTH AND THEIR EFFECTS 
UPON THE FATHER, MOTHER, AND THE CHILD 31, 35, 101 (1876); DIO LEWIS, CHASTITY, OR OUR SECRET SINS 89-
109, 183 (1874); WILLIAM WALLINGS, SEXOLOGY 74 (1876); JOHN TODD, SERPENT IN A DOVE’S NEST 23-24 (1867); 
William Goodell, Clinical Lecture on Conjugal Onanism and Kindred Sin, PHILA. MED. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1872, at 
161, 162; Pallen, supra note 44, at 205. 
50 GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 193. See generally GROSSBERG, supra, at 175-78, 193-95; JOHN & ROBIN HALLER, 
THE PHYSICIAN AND SEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 114-15, 122-24 (1974). 
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this—Ezra Heywood—later defended the use of a contraceptive syringe.51 Other pro-feminist 
men openly advocated contraception while condemning abortion, a stance most feminists simi-
larly embraced.52  
 Abortion rights advocates similarly attempt to obfuscate the distinction today.53 Abortion 
has, and always has had, a different moral and legal quality compared to contraception or others 
forms of reproductive and sexual privacy, for abortion involves the killing of an embryo or a fe-
tus regardless of how one morally evaluates the status of that being. The drawing of this distinc-
tion continues down to today,54 and continued throughout the time that both abortion and contra-
ception were becoming technologically feasible. For example, a survey of British physicians in 
1922 found three-fourths of them supportive of birth control while very few supported the ready 
availability of abortion.55 Even the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade recognized that the evolving 
traditions regarding other forms of intimate privacy simply do not correspond to the abortion 
                                                 
51 EZRA HEYWOOD, CUPID’S YOKE; OR, THE BINDING FORCES OF CONJUGAL LIFE 20 (1887). See GORDON, supra 
note 5, at 107-09). 
52 See D.M. BENNETT, ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND HIS CAREER OF CRIME AND CRUELTY 1068 (1878); EDWARD BOND 
FOOTE, THE RADICAL REMEDY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 89 (1886); FREDERICK HOLLICK, THE MARRIAGE GUIDE OR 
NATURAL HISTORY OF GENERATION 334 (1850). See generally BRODIE, supra note 21, at 193-94; C. THOMAS DIE-
NES, LAW, POLITICS AND BIRTH CONTROL 63 (1972); DEGLER, supra note 11, at 201-02; D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, 
supra note 24, at 50-63, 64-65; GORDON, supra note 5, at 97-100; GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 169-70, 187-95. 
53 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVID-
UAL FREEDOM 32-34 (1993); CHERYL MEYER, THE WANDERING UTERUS: POLITICS AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
OF WOMEN 133-35 (1997); Susan Estrich & Kathleen Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 
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54 See NANETTE DAVIS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE xiii, 3-4 (1985); DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 10-24, 29-35, 50, 56-
60, 67-101; HARRISON, supra note 21, at 219-21, 225-26, 250-51.  
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situation.56 The joint plurality opinion of Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter made the 
same point in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,57 as did the two dis-
senting opinions representing four other justices.58 Furthermore, the historical record itself dem-
onstrates that the traditional condemnation of abortion in England and America was independent 
of the sometimes widespread opposition to contraception. As Dr. Alice Bunker Stockham put it 
in 1887, “[t]he remedy is in the prevention of pregnancy, not in producing abortion.”59 Yet at 
least one feminist historian, who noted this support for contraception, was so intent on conflating 
abortion and contraception that she never seemed to notice the differing professional response to 
the two procedures.60 
 Nor, when one fairly reads the record of what was said or written about abortion, can one 
fairly equate opposition to abortion in the nineteenth century to support for paternal dominance 
in the home. In fact, one of the stronger strands in the traditional condemnation of abortion has 
been the protection of the woman, even, if need be, against her husband.61 The two Historians’ 
Briefs admit as much, at least regarding the statutes adopted in the nineteenth century.62 This tra-
                                                 
56 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
57 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (Kennedy, O’Connor, & Souter, JJ., joint plurality op.). 
58 Id. at 951-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Thomas, & White, JJ.), 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting, 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas & White, JJ.). 
59 STOCKHAM, supra note 29, at 250. See also Anthony, supra note 29 (calling for an investigation into causes). 
60 BROOKES, supra note 21, at 65, 70-71. 
61 See, e.g., Rex v. Scharp, THE LONDON EYRE OF 1276, at 23 (no. 76) (London Rec. Soc’y 1976) (a husband cannot 
compel his wife to have an abortion; therefore the husband’s consent did not immunize the crime from prosecution) 
(quoted in Chapter 3, at note 92).  
62 Casey Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 11-13; Webster Historians’ Brief, supra note 15, at 173.  
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dition views the woman undergoing an abortion as victim rather than culprit.63 The tradition can 
be traced back to the very beginnings of the common law, when abortion, along with the rape of 
her virginity and the murder of her husband in her arms, were the only three personal invasions 
for which a woman could bring an appeal of felony without the consent of and representation by 
her husband or another appropriate male relative.64 Also evidencing the policy of protecting the 
woman was the rule, which even law professor Cyril Means, jr., termed “an act or restoration 
gallantry,” that an abortion causing the death of the mother is murder regardless of whether the 
killing of the fetus would be a punishable offense.65 The nineteenth century feminists’ opinion of 
abortion and abortion laws fell squarely within this tradition.  
 The notion that men were behind abortion has an ancient pedigree. Anthropologist Georges 
Devereux found that in pre-industrial societies around the world female attitudes towards preg-
nancy and abortion were largely determined by the attitudes of their men towards becoming a 
father.66 Even when a woman chose to seek abortion on her own, including when she would 
abort out of spite against the man, her actions were largely a reaction to his attitudes rather than 
                                                 
63 See Peoples v. Commonwealth, 9 S.W. 509, 510 (Ky. 1898); State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114-15 (1858); 
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determined simply by her own desires.67 And, of course, down through the ages more than a few 
women were literally coerced into attempting abortion—especially when abortion was tanta-
mount to suicide.68 The idea that abortion is solely a woman’s concern, or solely of concern to 
the mother and to the fetus, is a distinctly modern view.69  
 Even today the father’s attitude is likely to be extremely important to a woman who is seek-
ing an abortion. A woman is far more likely to seek to abort if the father does not want the child, 
particularly if it is evident that she will receive no support or help from him.70 Furthermore, even 
the Alan Guttmacher Institute—the research arm of the National Abortion Rights Action League 
as it was then known—found that in large measure a woman sought an abortion because of their 
man’s attitude. In a 1987 survey of 1,900 women who had had abortion, the Institute found that 
68 percent did so because they could not afford a baby at the time, 51 percent said they sought an 
abortion because they either had problems in their relationship with the father or had no relation-
                                                 
67 Id. at 136. 
68 See Chapter 1. 
69 See generally George Harris, Fathers and Fetuses, 96 ETHICS 594 (1986). 
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ship at all with the father, and 23 percent sought an abortion because the father insisted on it.71 
Some 29 percent of the women reported that they had sought an abortion because their partner 
would not, or could not, marry her, while another 32 percent indicated that they expected the re-
lationship to break up soon.72 No wonder so many women report that they felt isolated and alone 
when they underwent an abortion.73 These feelings, and the attitude of the man generally, is even 
more important when abortion is illegal.74 
 The nineteenth century feminists often insisted that the criminal was either the abortionist 
(regardless of gender) or the man responsible for the pregnancy (who, they realized, often pres-
sured an unwilling woman into an abortion), not the woman.75 Some feminists reasoned from 
this view of the matter that only the man (or perhaps the abortionist regardless of gender) in-
volved should be guilty of a crime, and not the mother. Dr. Stockham noted that “[a]n unmarried 
                                                 
71 Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 170 
(1988). 
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73 EVE KUSHNER, EXPERIENCING ABORTION xx (1997). See also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 74 (1982). 
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tion in Kenya: Its Determinants and Associated Factors, 73 E. AFR. MED. J. 164 (1966). 
75 See, e.g., Anonymous, Why Not? A Book for Every Woman: A Woman’s View, 75 BOS. MED. & SURGICAL J. no. 
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woman, seduced under false representations by a man who feels no responsibility for his own 
offspring, suffers alone all the shame and contumely of the act, and is tempted to cause miscar-
riage to shield her good name.”76 Matilda Gage expressed a stronger version of this view right 
after the Civil War: 
I hesitate not to assert that most of this crime of “child murder,” “abortion,” “infanti-
cide,” lies at the door of the male sex.... Many a woman has laughed a silent, derisive 
laugh at the decisions of eminent medical and legal authorities, in cases of crimes com-
mitted against her as a woman. Never, until she sits as a juror at such trials, will or can 
just decisions be rendered.77 
 Gage concluded that “[t]he crime of abortion is not one in which the guilt lies solely or 
chiefly with the woman” because the crime resulted from the denial of a woman’s “right to her-
self,” not as an exercise of that right.78 She pointedly lay full responsibility for abortion on the 
machinations of men. Like most nineteenth century feminists,79 Gage addressed the causes of 
abortion, including marital rape and exploitive relations between the sexes that left women vul-
nerable and, all too often, desperate. She, like other nineteenth century feminists who supported 
the criminal laws against abortion, did not suppose that the criminal statutes alone were suffi-
cient, but also sought measures to eliminate the causes of abortion as well as the practice. 
 This feminist view neatly captured the long-standing tradition that the women who under-
went abortions were victims of the crime rather than culprits. Such sentiments were not limited 
to women. For example, Dr. John Cowan wrote that “the licentiousness of the man and bondage 
                                                 
76 STOCKHAM, supra note 29, at 247.  
77 Gage, supra note 29, at 215-16. James Mohr quoted only the first sentence of this passage. MOHR, supra note 4, 
at 112.  
78 Id. 
79 See, e.g., STOCKHAM, supra note 29, at 250; Anthony, supra note 29; Abigail Dunaway, Liberty for the Married 
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of the woman ... [produce] the monstrous crime ... the murder of the unborn.”80 Even Horatio 
Robinson Storer, a leading campaigner against abortion among physicians whom modern abor-
tion rights advocates assure us was utterly misogynistic,81 recognized the guilt of husbands and 
lovers in encouraging or compelling abortions, although he did not excuse the mother for her 
share of responsibility.82 Storer, the first true professor of gynecology, also denounced marital 
rape83 and decried those who would treat a woman’s body as a “mere plaything.”84 
 The view that men were responsible for abortion was fully realized in the prosecution pat-
terns as the nineteenth century turned to the twentieth century. Men involved with unmarried 
women who died from abortions were one of the more frequent targets of arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration.85 Only occasionally, however, did a more fortunate woman apparently exploit this 
feature of the abortion laws to make the responsible man “suffer for it.”86  
 The “free love wing” of nineteenth-century feminists shared the same view of abortion of 
the more mainstream leaders.87 The label “free love,” when used by members of the “free love” 
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movement in that century, did not have the salacious meaning ascribed to it by its enemies.88 
Those in the movement argued not that people should indulge in sexual relations without re-
straint, but that sexual relations should be based solely upon feelings of love—feelings that were 
not always present in marriage and sometimes were present outside of marriage.89 As historian 
Carl Degler noted, the “free love” movement of the nineteenth century was more devoted to giv-
ing women the right to say no within marriage than the right to say yes outside of marriage.90  
 Victoria Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin were sisters who led the “free love” wing of nine-
teenth-century feminism.91 As their espousal of “free love” suggests, they were particularly in-
dependent in their thinking and in their actions. The sisters were the first women stockbrokers in 
New York, becoming millionaires.92 Woodhull also became the first woman to run for President 
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(with Frederick Douglas as her vice-presidential candidate),93 under the guise of the “People’s 
Party” some 15 years before the large scale Populist movement of the last fifteen years of the 
nineteenth century emerged. And Woodhull became the first woman ever to testify before a con-
gressional committee—on January 11, 1871, on the vote for women, with Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony looking on.94  
 Victoria Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin had unsavory personal reputations, coming as they 
did from a family with a history of personal scandal.95 Their political positions were also quite 
radical for their time. Woodhull & Claflin’s Weekly printed the Communist Manifesto in Eng-
lish—more than 20 years after its initial appearance, but before any other press in the United 
States had done so.96 Woodhull also served as honorary president of the American branch of 
Marx’s First International.97 They supported abolition of the death penalty, an international tri-
bunal backed by an international military to settle disputes and to enforce peace, a national edu-
cational and welfare system, nationalization of mines, and progressive taxation—and “free 
love.”98 The two sisters were even jailed at the instigation of Anthony Comstock on the grounds 
that the journal they published was obscene, although they were released after one month.99 No 
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wonder historian Milton Rugoff described Woodhull as “in her life and loves as well as her 
views she was one of the most emancipated and uninhibited women of that or any other Ameri-
can time.”100 
 The sisters Woodhill and Claflin did not support abortion rights. They published a journal in 
which they declared that any claim that abortion was not murder was so flimsy that those making 
such a claim “fully realize the enormity of the crime” and were not making a serious exculpatory 
argument.101 The sisters also published in their journal the following statement of Sarah Norton: 
Perhaps there will come a time when the man who wantonly kills a woman and her babe 
[through abortion] will be loathed and scorned as deeply as the woman is now loathed 
and scorned who becomes his dupe; when the sympathy of society will be with the vic-
tim rather than the victimizer; when an unmarried mother will not be despised because 
of her motherhood; when unchastity in men will be placed on an equality with unchas-
tity in women, and when the right of the unborn to be born will not be denied or inter-
fered with...102 
Men in the free love movement also condemned abortion.103  
In contrast with the views of the nineteenth-century feminists, historian James Mohr 
somehow concluded that most nineteenth-century abortions resulted from mutual agreement be-
tween loving couples.104 Remarkably, Mohr supported his claim by referring only to a diary that 
disclosed that the woman had undergone an abortion without bothering to tell her husband. Con-
siderable evidence continues to suggest that even today men responsible for unwanted pregnan-
                                                 
100 MILTON RUGOFF, THE BEECHERS: AN AMERICAN FAMILY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 486 (1981). 
101 Victoria Woodhull & Tennessee Claflin, The Slaughter of the Innocents, WOODHULL & CLAFLIN’S WEEKLY 
(June 20, 1874). See generally MOHR, supra note 4, at 112-13; TONE, supra note 99, at 16-18, 297 n.46. 
102 Sarah Norton, Tragedy, Social and Domestic, WOODHULL & CLAFLIN’S WEEKLY (Nov. 19, 1870). 
103 See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 119, at 1068; FOOTE, supra note 119, at 89 (1886); HEYWOOD, supra note 118, at 
20. See generally TONE, supra note 99, at 16-17, 297 n.46. 
104 MOHR, supra note 4, at 114-17. See also GINSBURG, supra note 5, at 30; Daniel Scott Smith, Family Limitation, 
Sexual Conduct, and Domestic Feminism in Victorian America, 1 FEMINIST STUD. 40 (1973). 
You’re So Vain 
 21
cies often pressure unwilling women into having abortions, pressure that succeeds more easily 
without legal barriers to abortion.105 Additional pressures can also come from the mother’s par-
ents, particularly if the mother is an adolescent106—or from the parents of the father if he also is 
an adolescent.107 Even employers sometimes put intense pressure on pregnant women to abort.108  
 Curiously lacking in the writings of both the nineteenth-century feminists and their contem-
porary critics was any discussion of the role of prostitutes as providing a major market for the 
expanding abortion industry although there is some persuasive evidence of this in some medical 
reports of the time.109 Nineteenth-century feminists almost uniformly condemned prostitution 
and devoted considerable energy to crusading against it as something that had to be suppressed 
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in order to achieve control over male sexuality.110 Those early feminists coupled their condemna-
tion of prostitution coupled with sympathy for the prostitute.111 Ironically, modern feminist his-
torians tend to see a link between the increasingly harsh criminal penalties applied to prostitution 
and the increasing legal activity directed against abortion, seeing both as attempts to control fe-
male sexuality—without bothering to explain why such control should have come to the fore in 
the nineteenth century and without noting that nineteenth century feminists strongly favored both 
sets of penalties.112 The role of the early feminists in opposing both prostitution and abortion 
suggests some interesting speculations about how such a link might have affected their attitudes 
toward abortion.  
 Nineteenth century feminists did not simply talk about abortion as another form of male 
domination of women. Many feminists undertook to organize practical aid for pregnant, unmar-
ried women and girls. Marvin Olasky has documented the efforts of women (sometimes with the 
help of sympathetic men) across the United States to provide shelter and medical care for those 
who had been seduced and abandoned, or at least who found themselves pregnant, homeless, and 
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without financial resources.113 By 1895, Chicago alone had at least a dozen shelters for the un-
married pregnant, with the most active of these shelters caring for 1,291 adults and 1,361 chil-
dren in 1893.114 These homes offered to place the children for adoption, offered education and 
job placement for the mothers, and provided personal counseling that it was hoped would enable 
the women and girls to avoid such problems in the future.115 More than a few of the persons in-
volved in these efforts were explicit that a major goal was to provide an alternative to abor-
tion.116 
 As the foregoing demonstrates, feminist support for abortion laws that severely punished the 
men whom the feminists considered truly responsible for an abortion but did not punish the 
mother were based on a reality they well understood. Nineteenth century feminists saw abortion 
as something that was done to women, rather than as something done by women. This vision un-
derlies the laws enacted in most states during the nineteenth century—under which the woman 
committed no crime.117 Nonetheless, these laws did greatly restrict women’s access to abor-
tion.118 The feminist concern to protect women from being pushed into an abortion by the men in 
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their lives also serves to place the issue of abortion into the broader debate between the feminists 
and their critics over the institution of marriage. 
 The feminists of that time were critical (to varying degrees) of marriage as a form of bond-
age.119 The first step taken to break the cruder forms of bondage in marriage was the Married 
Women’s Acts, giving married women the right to own property and to manage their own in-
comes.120 Before these laws, married women in common law countries were considered legally 
merged with their husband—who was vested with authority of the married women’s property 
and incomes. While some modern feminist historians choose to see these acts as motivated by a 
desire to provide greater rights to creditors,121 historian Jean Donnison is closer to the mark in 
concluding that nineteenth century feminism was born in the struggle for these statutes.122 
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 Feminist leaders of virtually every branch of the movement took a radical stance against the 
mistreatment of women in or out of marriage and most embraced a frank understanding and ac-
ceptance of female sexuality at a time when Victorian morality insisted that women were chaste 
beings who must subordinate their sexuality to nurturing and reproduction.123 Dr. William Acton 
expressed the then prevalent view, against which the feminists were contending, in these words: 
“The majority of women (happily for them) are not very troubled with sexual feelings of any 
kind. What men are habitually, women are only exceptionally.”124 Despite Acton’s double stan-
dard, the social strictures imposed on men during this same era were hardly less debilitating.125  
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 Recently, some revisionist historians have argued that Victorians were not repressive about 
sexuality.126 These “new histories” do demonstrate that many people of both genders gave con-
siderable attention to their inner life back then—including their own personal sexual needs. (And 
when wasn’t this true?) Yet these arguments serve more to highlight that the depth that separates 
us from Victorian times has become so great that some historians can no longer imagine a time 
so sexually repressive as the histories indicate that they feel impelled to try to persuade us that 
the Victorians were in fact happily unrepressed sexually.127  
 While the “free love” wing was at an extreme in the criticism of the institution of marriage, 
even the most mainstream feminists were comfortable comparing marriage with the chattel slav-
ery abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment.128 Interestingly, this point was first made, in writ-
ing at least, by a man.129 We have already seen the strained readings given these materials by 
such modern feminists as law professor Reva Siegel.130 Yet the divorce reform movement of the 
late nineteenth-century was led by men such as Samuel Dike motivated more by eugenic con-
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cerns—the wrong people were marrying—than by any concern about individual liberation.131 In 
contrast, by the end of the nineteenth century, most feminist leaders had joined in an attempt to 
make divorce more difficult to obtain.132  
 The truth is that most nineteenth century feminists, including even the “free love” wing, 
wanted to strengthen marriage rather than destroy it.133 After all, fewer than five percent of white 
women in the United States worked outside the home after marriage during the nineteenth cen-
tury134—and the feminist leaders of the time were predominantly white and married. No wonder 
the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and other feminist groups often acted as “marriage 
enforcers” at this time, pressuring men to marry their pregnant paramours (and sometimes pres-
suring the women involved as well) unless they considered the marriage hopeless.135 
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 Like Horatio Robinson Storer, the nineteenth-century feminists were strongly in favor of the 
rational spacing of children, speaking in terms of “voluntary motherhood.”136 Given the then 
technical incapacity to prevent conception mechanically or pharmacologically,137 one is not sur-
prised that nineteenth century feminists advocated the right to refuse a husband’s sexual ad-
vances as the means to achieve the desired “voluntary motherhood.”138 If a woman lacked the 
ability to refuse her husband directly, Dr. Alice Bunker Stockham recommended sexual coldness 
as a birth control device.139 Although such advice refutes the charge that feminists in general 
supported “free love” in the salacious sense, the advice could hardly refute the claim that femi-
nism was inimical to the family as total abstinence would require separate households for the 
wife and the husband.140 Nor, for that matter, could a program of sexual abstinence and emo-
tional withdrawal assure women the fiscal security and moral power that at the time derived from 
the actuality or prospect of motherhood.141 What such women needed rather desperately was a 
technique that would allow them to prevent or terminate a pregnancy without reliance on crude 
sexual refusal. No wonder Victorian women generally seem to have opted not for coldness, but 
for the appearance of frailty as a device for limiting their husband’s sexual access.142  
 Again we find Dr. Horatio Robinson Storer confounding his modern critics by taking the 
same line as nearly all feminists did. Storer apparently contemplated the sensible use of contra-
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ception or abstinence as preferred by many feminists, advocating the spacing children about 
three years apart in the very passages in which he argued for the necessity of pregnancy for 
women to retain their good health.143 And the leading feminists, like Storer, condemned male 
complicity in the crime of abortion, but not as a means of excusing the abortion nor as a means 
of expressing hostility to sexual indulgence. All were uncompromising in their view of abortion.  
 Such attitudes persisted among feminists well into the twentieth century. For example, Mar-
garet Sanger, famous as the founder of the birth control movement consistently and repeatedly 
condemned abortion as murder.144 Dr. Marie Stopes, who played a similar role in England, also 
condemned abortion as murder.145 As late as 1960, Dr. Mary Calderone, the medical director of 
Planned Parenthood and later one of the strongest supporters of the supposed freedom to abort, 
described abortion as “the taking of a life.”146 In short, until quite recently most feminists were 
strong opponents of abortion, and the farther back one goes in time the more nearly unanimous 
feminists become in their hostility to abortion. 
OBFUSCATING NINETEENTH CENTURY FEMINIST ATTITUDES  
 Deconstruction is the banana peel on the sidewalk of language. 
—Sydney DeLong147 
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 Reading the new orthodoxy of abortion history, one would never guess that the feminists of 
the nineteenth century were so consistently and so strongly opposed to abortion. This raises the 
intriguing question of why do feminist and other pro-abortion historians today seem incapable of 
realizing that until recently even the most militant feminists considered abortion an abominable 
crime against nature and against women, a crime that society should prohibit and attempt to 
stamp out. These historians, in crafting the new orthodox history of abortion, claim to have “de-
constructed” the attitudes of the early feminists to discover hidden support for abortion for which 
there is no evidence except the historian’s intuition. The thought is captured in historian James 
Mohr’s comment that “the relationship between abortion and feminism in the nineteenth century 
nevertheless remained indirect and ironical.”148 No extended analysis of deconstruction theory is 
necessary to understand how it has affected the way we envision the history of abortion. It is 
only necessary to know that such theories embrace a thorough going skepticism that concludes 
that the only truth is that there is no truth,149 overlooking the contradiction inherent in such a 
view.150 Accepting this proposition often cause such scholars to miss the fact that although one 
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might not be able to determine the truth in any ultimate sense, one often can recognize lies.151 
Yet, as Tatyana Tolstaya has written, “lying, perhaps humankind’s primary weakness, is pre-
cisely what historians must overcome.”152 This turns out to be a serious problem for historians of 
abortion, although it is not always clear whether the historian is lying to her readers or to herself. 
 Historian Linda Gordon provides a prime example. While frankly acknowledging that nine-
teenth-century feminists opposed abortion, she sought to explain that reality away as represent-
ing a “false consciousness.”153 Gordon at least is honest about what she is attempting. She is one 
of the few historians of the new orthodoxy of abortion history to admit expressly that much of 
her work relating to the use and regulation of birth control techniques is “not a history but a 
schematic hypothesis [that] does not purport to describe what actually happened but offers a 
theoretical model of the way it might have happened.”154 In other words, Gordon writes her “his-
tory” of the lives of women in times past much like monks in medieval monasteries wrote of 
their “lives” of saints—works in which the imagination of the author filled in innumerable de-
tails in the absence of, or even in defiance of, relevant written records. Like those lives of saints, 
Gordon’s disclaimer has not prevented others from relying on Gordon’s work as if it were divine 
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revelation.155 Excessive reliance on Gordon’s work comes about in no small measure because 
Gordon never reverts to this point again and takes no steps to indicate which parts of her work 
represent historical data and which represents her imagination. Furthermore, Gordon’s remarks 
about “false consciousness” play right into her predilection to invent what she cannot discover. 
 Some prominent feminist scholars have long argued that “consciousness raising” is the cen-
tral feminist contribution to the intellectual enterprise, precisely because they consider the “con-
sciousness” of most women—other than some feminists—to be “false.”156 Claims of “false con-
sciousness,” however, often are simply a ploy to enable one to claim as fact something that the 
women actually involved (and other witnesses) deny. No wonder even some feminist scholars 
have described the theory of “false consciousness” as off-putting and counterproductive,157 or as 
simply a strategic ploy, not a truth about certain women’s experiences.158  
 Given Gordon’s attitude towards historical evidence, one is not surprised to discover that 
she seems unable to recognize evidence of the widespread acceptance among all classes of 
women of the idea that abortion involved the killing of the child. Thus, Gordon quotes a letter 
from 1916 in which a young mother laments having considered killing a child through abortion, 
and her happiness that she had not done so, yet Gordon sees only a mother who desires to control 
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births.159 Linda Gordon also quotes the following letter, written in 1859 by a woman school-
teacher in Massachusetts to her parents in New Hampshire:  
Alphens’ wife has been up here with her mother all summer. Poor Alphens he has got 
so poor that he cant keep house so he sent his wife to live on his father all winter—her 
poor health was caused by getting rid of a child as I suppose Alphens didnt feel able to 
maintain another one you must not say anything as I have only guessed it she was very 
large when she came here and in a short time she shrank to her normal size.160 
Gordon reads this barely literate letter as indicating a casual acceptance of abortion by persons of 
the writer’s class (“rural, upper middle class, respectable” is Gordon’s description of the writer, 
Elisa Adams), despite the writer’s admonition not to mention the event to anyone and despite the 
rather evident fact that the woman involved (“Alphens’ wife”) did not want to advertise the 
event. This is similar to Gordon’s insistence that knowledge of how to do safe and effective 
abortions was widespread even while she herself referred to numerous letters sent to birth control 
advocates in the early twentieth century that, directly or indirectly, indicated that numerous cou-
ples had not the foggiest notion of how to get an abortion.161  
 As we have seen, there is considerable warrant for believing that ignorance of how to do 
abortions prevailed throughout most of our history.162 We find some confirmation of this in the 
remarkably detailed diary of midwife Martha Ballard.163 Ballard’s diary covers the period from 
1785 to 1812, when Mohr, Gordon, and others insist that midwives were commonly performing 
abortions, yet Ballard does not mention even a single abortion in her diary. We cannot assume 
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that Ballard simply did not bother to report her participation in such activities; her diary includes 
accounts of incest, illegitimacy, child abuse, and other unsavory activities, as well as many rou-
tine and unremarkable activities. Either Ballard considered abortion even more vile than the 
things she recorded or she did nor know of any abortions. 
 James Mohr, archpriest of the new orthodoxy of abortion history, is perhaps the best exem-
plar of obfuscation of the attitudes of nineteenth century feminists toward abortion. Mohr intro-
duced his discussion of feminist attitudes by attributing the rising incidence of abortion largely 
to changes in social mores among upper class, native born, Protestant women.164 There is some 
support in the anti-abortion writings of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury to support this claim, notably among those who feared “race suicide.”165 This conclusion 
might be partially correct, although it ignores the effects of changing technology on social mo-
res. In other words, abortion had become possible by the later years of the nineteenth century 
because of changing medical technology, and not simply because a certain class of women now 
wanted abortions. And in fact, there actually is no evidence indicating whether upper class, na-
tive born, Protestant women were having abortions more often than lower class or immigrant or 
Catholic or Jewish women. The only indirect evidence that might support such a conclusion is 
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that the birthrate for upper-class, native born, Protestant women was falling faster than for other 
groups of women—but even Mohr conceded elsewhere in his book that abortion cannot have 
been the primary means for creating this differential.166 
 The falling birthrate was indeed the root of the “race suicide” fears, and as the physicians 
writing the books served an upper-class, native born, Protestant clientele, it is not surprising that 
the women they encountered who sought abortions fit that description. It hardly proves that these 
women had more frequent abortions than the groups of women about which these physicians 
knew little or nothing. By focusing his discussion on who was having abortions rather than how 
abortions were being done, however, Mohr sought to link the rise of abortion to the simultaneous 
widespread emergence of feminism in the United States.167 Mohr found his link in allegations by 
men opposed to feminism who often described women who sought abortion to be selfish and 
fashion-driven.168 Non-physician opponents of abortion sometimes made the same accusation.169  
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 Some the nineteenth century critics of feminism depicted abortions as done by women to 
women.170 The tone of such remarks suggests that the critics saw the feminists as engaged in a 
conspiracy against men.171 Some physicians also suggested that the rising incidence of abortion 
came from growing fears on the part of some women of death or serious injury through giving 
birth.172 And, as we have seen, complaints that midwives doubled as abortionists go back centu-
ries, both in England and in America.173 Male physicians in the mid-nineteenth-century also 
charged women physicians with doing abortions, but without presenting any evidence to support 
the claim.174 Mohr was aware of these charges,175 but for some reason did not mention them as 
relevant to whether the nineteenth century feminists supported abortion. Instead, Mohr was con-
tent with two male physicians who espoused what Mohr termed a “feminist” view of the matter. 
 Of Mohr’s male “feminists,” one was an anonymous male physician who did appear to sup-
port strongly what are now termed abortion rights.176 Mohr buried in a distant endnote, however, 
an admission that the anonymous author drew his arguments from a feminist book that “itself 
                                                 
170 See, e.g., HALE, supra note 168, at 17; STORER & HEARD, supra note 86, at 97-103; TODD, supra note 49, at 4. 
See also SYLVANUS STALL, WHAT A YOUNG MAN OUGHT TO KNOW 198 (1897) (similar claims in a Canadian set-
ting). See generally E.R. NORMAN, CHURCH AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND, 1770-1970, at 270 (1976); McLaren, supra 
note 164, at 319-20. For modern echoes of this theory, see Chapter 1, at notes 18-30. 
171 See WALSH, supra note 44, at 72 n.86; Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 130, at 49-51; Siegel, supra note 5, at 
300-01. See generally WALSH, supra, at 106-77. 
172 See, e.g., E.P. Christian, The Pathological Consequences Incident to Induced Abortion, 2 DET. REV. MED. & 
PHARMACY 147, 147 (1867); John Trader, Criminal Abortion, 11 ST. L. MED. & SURGICAL J., n.s. 583, 588 (1874). 
See also MOHR, supra note 4, at 108, 170. 
173 See Chapter 1, at notes 15-17; Chapter 2, at notes 283-89; Chapter 4, at 308-11. 
174 See, e.g., HARRIOT KEZIA HUNT, GLANCES AND GLIMPSES; OR FIFTY YEARS SOCIAL, INCLUDING TWENTY YEARS 
PROFESSIONAL, LIFE 159 (1856; reprinted 1970). See also WALSH, supra note 44, at 145-46. 
175 MOHR, supra note 4, at 86-90. 
176 Anonymous, Abortion, 7 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 170 (1889). See MOHR, supra note 4, at 108-09, 113. 
You’re So Vain 
 37
was by no means pro-abortion.”177 In any event, the very anonymity of the article speaks elo-
quently of the authors’ perception of the popular attitude. The other male “feminist” was Dr. 
Henry Wright, whose book seems to have been a regretful apology for the reality of abortion 
rather than an argument in its favor.178 In an earlier book, Wright had castigated the medical pro-
fession for its apparent willingness to condone abortions when performed by allopathic physi-
cians while prosecuting abortions when performed by others.179 Such criticism hardly supports a 
view of Wright as a friend of abortion.180  
 Mohr’s problem was that the leading feminists of the nineteenth century were virtually 
unanimous in supporting the prohibition of abortion as a crime because of a professed concern to 
protect prenatal human life.181 This reality severely undercut Mohr’s claim that only physicians 
were staking out such an “idiosyncratic” position.182 Mohr and other researchers actually found 
only one undoubted feminist advocating a right to abort during the nineteenth century, and this 
not until 1893.183 By that time, abortion laws had produced a situation where abortion no longer 
was, as Mohr himself put it, a “viable alternative.”184  
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 To buttress his claims, Mohr turned to this sole feminist who, before the very end of the cen-
tury, actually seemed to support abortion rights in an anonymous letter written from Maine to 
The Revolution, a feminist journal, in 1868.185 This “Conspirator,” as the letter writer styled her-
self, did seem to endorse the practice of abortion, but she was hardly an unequivocal supporter. 
So intent was she on criticizing the evils of marriage (rather than on defending abortion) that her 
pseudonym seems to refer to a “conspirator against marriage” rather than a conspirator seeking 
an abortion for herself or others. Indeed, the anonymous writer acknowledged what was in fact 
the major disincentive to abortion—women knew that abortion endangered their lives, a risk they 
were willing to undergo to escape having further children “whom the brutal lusts of a drunken 
husband have forced upon them.”186 Mohr attempted to increase the impact of this letter by not-
ing that the journal was owned by Susan B. Anthony and edited by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and 
Parker Pillsbury, as if their publication of the letter committed them to supporting abortion.187 He 
did not bother to inform his readers that Anthony and Stanton had described abortion in signed 
articles in the same journal as the murder of children.188  
 To buttress his singular feminist advocate of abortion rights, Mohr quoted from several of 
the women quoted in Dr. Wright’s book. Dr. Wright’s book does demonstrate that women were 
beginning to have abortions by the 1850s and perhaps even before then, yet unless we are to in-
fer from the mere existence of a practice that people accepted it as legitimate, we must ask what 
women who had abortions, and those who aided them, thought about what they were doing. This 
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question is one that Mohr simply ignored. Dr. Wright quoted from several women describing 
their abortions, generally in the most remorseful terms and clearly indicating that they them-
selves considered the act to have killed a child.189 Mohr translated these views into the laconic 
statement that the women involved “hated to have to do it.”190 Mohr undercut this summation, 
however, by immediately quoting at length from a woman who, after describing how “a woman, 
a friend in whom I trusted” and the friend’s “family physician”191 “labored” to convince the au-
thor that the child was not alive until birth, concluded her description of the experience thusly: 
My only trouble was, with God’s view of the case, I could not get rid of the feeling that 
it was an outrage on my body and soul, and on my unconscious babe.... Though I de-
termined to do the deed, my reason, my conscience, my self-respect, my entire nature, 
revolted against my decision. My Womanhood rose up in withering condemnation.192 
 Statements such as these hardly express support for a freedom to abort, or of claims that the 
fetus was not yet a person, or that abortion was widely accepted as morally neutral. Mohr, how-
ever, chose this very quotation to demonstrate that ordinary people in the nineteenth century did 
not believe that the fetus was a person and believed that abortion was morally neutral.193 Mohr 
also saw such stories as supporting the quickening doctrine.194 The quotation, to the contrary, 
explicitly indicates that while the “friend” and the “physician” rejected the recognition of fetal 
personhood at any point before birth, the mother did not express doubt about fetal personhood at 
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any point of gestation. Mohr went on to claim that the views of the friend and the physician “be-
came the basis of the official position of American feminists toward abortion after the Civil 
War,”195 without indicating what made any nineteenth-century woman’s position “official.” 
Mohr chose instead to refer to several leading feminists as supporting his claim that feminists’ 
viewed abortion as a tragic necessity.196  
 Mohr simply did not bother to quote a letter in which the writer described abortion as a re-
sponse to abuse within marriage, the desperation of the response shown, as the writer acknowl-
edged, by the willingness of women knowingly to risk death from the procedure. Nor did he con-
sider the extensive evidence that women who underwent abortions often felt great guilt about the 
procedure even decades after the event. Elizabeth Evans gathered remembrances from women 
who had survived abortions in a book she published in 1875 under the name The Abuse of Ma-
ternity.197 One woman recalled that she had “mourned for many years the sin committed in her 
youth,”198 while another woman stated that her memory of an abortion “serves as an effectual 
damper upon whatever degree of pride or satisfaction I might otherwise feel in the more praise-
worthy deeds of my career.”199 Numerous other women remembered terrible sorrow over the 
loss of a child never seen and lying in an unknown grave.200 According to Evans, doctors already 
recognized what today we would call “post-abortion syndrome”—“remorse [over abortion] … 
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causing nervous maladies.”201 Today many would argue that this was simply a “guilt trip” laid 
on women, a kind of “false consciousness,” and not a genuine expression of their “true selves.” 
202  
 Whatever one thinks of the idea of a “false consciousness,” the fact remains that many 
women did internalize the belief that abortion was wrong and reacted predictably to the guilt that 
resulted from the collision of those beliefs with having an abortion. Whether such feelings de-
rived from a false or a true consciousness, a great many people condemned abortion, even (or 
especially) after having undergone the procedure. None of this suggests that abortion was either 
common or widely accepted, by women or men. Nor does any shred of evidence suggest that the 
feminists of the time felt differently. 
 Mohr’s “evidence” of a feminist link to abortion was based more on an effort by the anti-
feminists of the time to smear feminists with the brush of a widely-abhorred practice than a 
genuine indication of the role of the emerging women’s movement. Law professor Reva Siegel 
virtually conceded as much when she wrote: “The [medical] profession’s antifeminist arguments 
imbued the practice of controlling birth with emancipatory significance, whether or not it had 
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this meaning for women who sought abortions.”203 Mohr’s argument204 that only allopathic phy-
sicians really wanted the new laws and that the public generally was tolerant or even supportive 
of abortion and abortionists thus fails even in terms of his own report of the attitudes of such a 
significantly interested group as politically active nineteenth-century women. This fact returns us 
to the central puzzle that arises if we take Mohr’s second thesis seriously: Why would such self-
aware and active women205 be so gullible when it came to male assertions of control over their 
reproductive processes, particularly given their own defiant criticism of “male sexual license.”206 
It is worth recalling in this context the slogan coined by Christabel Pankhurst (a prominent Eng-
lish suffragist) that the feminists’ goal was “Votes for women and chastity for men.”207 
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 Mohr was forced, somewhat reluctantly, to acknowledge the problem feminists posed for his 
thesis when he wrote “the relationship between abortion and feminism in the nineteenth century 
nevertheless remained indirect and ironical.”208 Only at the very end of his discussion of femi-
nists and abortion, however, did Mohr acknowledge that all of the women whom he claimed 
supported a right to abort “found themselves in the anomalous position of endorsing the anti-
feminist physicians’ calls for anti-abortion legislation.”209 Indirect and ironical indeed. 
 Most other scholars writing on the history of abortion have taken the same or a similar line 
as Mohr. For example, sociologist Rosalind Petchesky preferred to dismiss feminist opposition 
to abortion as reflecting the pervasive influence of the patriarchal society in which these women 
lived.210 In sharp contrast, historian Carl Degler did not find feminist opposition to abortion as so 
anomalous; he saw it as of a piece with the opposition of organized feminists to slavery, the 
death penalty, war, and corporal punishment for crimes.211 Others, including the authors of the 
Historians’ Briefs, preferred simply to misrepresent what the feminists of the time thought.212  
 Despite such clear and direct evidence of what feminist leaders, and even ordinary women, 
knew and believed about fetuses and abortion in the middle and later years of the nineteenth cen-
tury, there actually is some evidence that ordinary people did not accept the personhood of the 
fetus during that period.213 That evidence is, however, similar to the strategy of the anti-feminists 
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of blaming abortion on the feminists. Long after a good many ordinary people had accepted the 
personhood of the fetus from conception onward and the view that even the earliest abortion was 
“child murder,” many in the professions of law and medicine apparently continued to believe 
that ordinary people entertained no such ideas.214 As late as 1923 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
would justify that state’s continued reliance on the quickening distinction as a practical necessity 
because of popular ignorance that a pre-quickening fetus was a living person in these words: 
In a strictly scientific and physiological sense there is life in an embryo from the time of 
conception, and in such sense there is also life in the male and female elements that 
unite to form the embryo. But law for obvious reasons cannot in its classifications fol-
low the latest or ultimate declarations of science. It must for purposes of practical effi-
ciency proceed upon more everyday and popular conceptions, especially as to defini-
tions of crimes that are malum in se. These must be of such a nature that the ordinary 
normal adult knows it is morally wrong to commit them. That it should be less of an of-
fense to destroy an embryo in a stage where human life in its common acceptance has 
not yet begun than to destroy a quick child is a conclusion that commends itself to most 
men.215 
 Similarly, Dr. Frederick Taussig, in his famous early (1936) study of abortion, reached 
much the same conclusion regarding his experience with patients: “Every physician will testify 
that it is without any feeling of guilt that most women speak of induced abortions in the consul-
tation room.”216 Perhaps such thinking had become more common in the early years of the twen-
tieth century, or perhaps such thinking commended itself to professionals (doctors as well as 
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lawyers) who encounter a rather select sample of those who are seeking or have obtained abor-
tions, yet (as Dr. Wright’s informants demonstrate) there actually is little evidence that such be-
liefs were still widely shared by “ordinary normal adults” in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries 
except in the professionals’ own impressions.217  
 Other modern historians indulge in even weaker arguments to explain why we must under-
stand that the early feminists simply did not mean it when they said over and over again that they 
considered abortion murder and wanted to put an end to it. Historian Janet Brodie contended that 
“social opprobrium” attached to abortion and contraception in the late nineteenth century solely 
because these had suddenly (and apparently inexplicably) been made criminal.218 Brodie also 
tells us that the women organized in a crusade for social purity opposed abortion only “in vague 
and general ways” as if this meant they did not really mean it.219 But what can you expect of an 
historian who tells us that Comstock’s law was passed by an inattentive Congress that really did 
not support the law220—a law that, as Judge John Noonan wrote, “[i]n penalizing the possession 
of contraceptives, … went further than any Pope or Canonist.”221 
 Historian Joan Hoff attempts much the same ploy when she attributes the failure of the nine-
teenth-century feminists to oppose abortion to their supposed single-minded devotion to securing 
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the vote, completely ignoring their publicly and frequently stated opposition to abortion as child-
murder.222 Historian Cornelia Dayton actually admitted to a certain puzzlement over why re-
ported abortions were invariably covert, even in the first months of pregnancy when (she pre-
sumed) it was legal, if abortion were widely known and socially accepted in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century America.223 Her unlikely answer is that abortion was hidden because it sig-
naled other acts that were socially condemned—fornication and adultery—even though everyone 
considered abortion itself unproblematic. There are two problems with her reasoning. First, did 
no married women seek an abortion when the child was not a result of adultery? Second, how, if 
abortion usually signaled unsavory conduct, would abortion avoid unsavory connotations? 
 Finally we come to the work of law professor Reva Siegel, whom Justice Blackmun adopted 
as his new primary source for the history of abortion in his separate opinion in the Casey deci-
sion.224 Siegel virtually conceded that the only people who saw feminism at work in such limited 
resistance to abortion laws as there was were the very same male physicians whom she saw as 
campaigning against women generally. Her observation that the antifeminist’s arguments “im-
bued the practice of controlling birth with emancipatory significance, whether or not it had this 
meaning for women who sought abortions”225 reveals her strategy for obfuscating this fact. 
Siegel consistently chose to write about “controlling birth” or “voluntary motherhood” rather 
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than about abortion as such.226 Siegel also repeatedly insisted that the common law did not re-
quire a woman to secure her husband’s consent to have an abortion.227 That is a meaningless 
claim—after all, abortion was a serious crime to which no one could assent. 
 Siegel would have us believe that anyone advocating birth control in the nineteenth century 
supported the practice of abortion.228 This same ploy was used in the Casey Historians’ Brief229 
and in numerous other histories that seek to obfuscate the nineteenth century feminist position on 
abortion.230 In fact, however, nineteenth-century feminists strongly condemned abortion as a 
crime231 while many of the same feminists openly espoused contraception.232 Siegel acknowl-
edged both of these facts only indirectly. After first noting that some feminists criticized contra-
ceptives as well as abortion,233 she simply asserted that “focusing on [the refusal of the feminists 
to endorse abortion] obscures the extent to which feminists of the era tacitly condoned abor-
tion.”234 At other points, Siegel noted several feminist tracts as “virtually condoning abortion.”235 
These tracts describe abortion with such names as “child murder,” hardly suggesting approval of 
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the practice, tacit or otherwise.236 In other words, Siegel found no evidence of nineteenth century 
feminist support for abortion; she presents us with a search for the lost meanings of not so lost 
voices, with nothing more to go on than the passionate certainty of her convictions.237 
 Siegel argued that the feminists were unwilling to express their support for abortion openly 
because women needed the hope for children to snare a husband and because the feminists were 
already marginalized as inimical to the family and as favoring “free love.”238 She relied on the 
work of historian Linda Gordon for “proof” of these conclusions regarding the nineteenth-
century feminists.239 We have already noted why there are serious problems in relying on 
Gordon’s work.240 Furthermore, Siegel acknowledged that the nineteenth-century feminists actu-
ally advocated the right to refuse a husband’s sexual advances as the means to achieve “volun-
tary motherhood.”241 This entire argument collapses on itself when Siegel tells us that the argu-
ment for voluntary motherhood derived from a far-ranging and strident critique of marriage.242 
 The closest Siegel came to finding a feminist directly supporting abortion is the same 
anonymous letter from somewhere in Maine that Mohr had relied on.243 Regarding this letter, 
Siegel can charitably be called confused. For some reason, Siegel miscited this letter by referring 
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to an article, Child Murder,244 written by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and published a week earlier 
than the anonymous letter.245 Siegel dated the article nearly a month later than its actual publica-
tion date. Beyond this, Siegel, like Mohr, could only argue that the feminist focus on the causes 
of abortion and hence on the behavior of men involved indicated that feminists opposed enact-
ment of the abortion statutes.246 Yet she herself offered in support of this claim quotations from 
an editorial by Susan B. Anthony that feminists “wanted prevention, not merely punishment,” 
that they wanted “to reach the root of evil, and destroy it,” and that they considered the women 
who sought abortions to be “awfully guilty” even if their men were “thrice guilty.”247 Siegel’s 
reliance on this as an endorsement of abortion rights sums up the quality of her “history.” 
 Have we crossed such a divide that feminist historians simply cannot conceive of a genuine 
feminist who actually opposed abortion? Or shall we accuse modern historians of frankly mis-
representing the historical record for political purposes? Or is it perhaps a little of both? Trying 
to answer this question requires a closer look at the strained efforts of the historians of the new 
orthodox history of abortion to “prove” that the nineteenth century feminists secretly supported 
abortion and only said they opposed abortion as a tactical maneuver. The plain fact is that no his-
torian can afford to ignore “the stubborn resistance of the raw materials.”248 Yet this is precisely 
what those who seek to obfuscate the attitudes of the nineteenth century feminists do. Their ap-
proach lends itself to the very sort of advocacy scholarship that has come to bedevil the legal en-
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terprise.249 As a result, even radically revisionist historians have been skeptical, if not downright 
hostile, to such “post-modern” history.250 
WOMEN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I – 
I took the one less traveled by. 
And that has made all the difference. 
—Robert Frost251 
 Those who would paint the struggle between allopaths and other healthcare providers in 
starkly genderized terms stumble over certain facts from the late nineteenth century. Although 
most allopathic physicians harbored genuine hostility toward the idea of women providing medi-
cal services and particularly towards midwives (not all of whom were women),252 women were 
by no means so thoroughly excluded from the medical profession as they later would be. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the period when the most restrictive abortion statutes were 
enacted, women achieved considerable success in entering the allopathic medical profession, far 
more success than they would in the first seventy years of the twentieth century. 
 Women have been heavily involved in the informal healing arts since time immemorial. The 
nineteenth century saw significant numbers of women enter the formal medical professions—
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allopathic, homeopathic, or other forms—for the first time.253 While women undoubtedly chose a 
formal medical career for many different reasons, a commonly expressed reason for their choice 
was to provide an alternative for women patients who, with the increasing medicalization of 
birth and related health problems, would otherwise be forced to turn to male physicians for ser-
vices previously provided by informal—usually female—healers.254 This was the era, remember, 
when women patients were still reluctant to allow male physicians to conduct genital examina-
tions or to examine them while disrobed, and when suspicions of sexual misbehavior by male 
physicians attending women patients were just beginning to subside.255 
 Women physicians were outspoken in criticizing the errors they believed male physicians 
made regarding women, women’s physiology, and women’s rights.256 Some of the women phy-
sicians also argued that they related fundamentally differently to their patients—female or 
male—than did men physicians.257 This era saw the opening of medical schools specifically to 
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train women as physicians, in part because of the refusal of established medical faculties to ac-
cept women students. Samuel Gregory in Boston founded the first women’s medical school in 
1848.258 The second was founded in 1850 in Philadelphia.259 For one year (1851-52), the two 
schools even shared faculty, offering the fall semester in Philadelphia and the spring semester in 
Boston.260 
 These schools often also developed what were first termed “lying-in” hospitals, and later 
“women’s and children’s hospitals,” attached both as teaching facilities and to provide for better 
supervised births. In the British Isles, lying-in hospitals were far older than in the United States, 
dating back to 1745 in Dublin, to 1747 in London, and to 1756 in Edinburgh.261 The Gregory 
school, renamed the New England Medical College, took over the Boston Lying-In Hospital in 
1858.262 The original resident physician at the hospital under the college, Dr. Marie Zakrzewska, 
resigned in 1862 to found the New England Hospital for Women and Children (“Women’s Hos-
pital”).263 Dr. Zakrzewska was a woman of considerable distinction, having been appointed chief 
midwife and professor of midwifery at Charité Hospital, the largest hospital in Prussia, in 1852 
at the age of 23, only to resign the position in the face of the intense resistance she encountered 
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because of her gender and her youth.264 Zakrzewska was also a co-founder, in 1857, of the New 
York Infirmary for Women and Children, the first hospital staffed entirely by women in the 
United States.265 The Boston Lying-In Hospital closed one week after Zakrzewska’s new hospi-
tal opened.266 The New England Medical College failed a decade later, and merged with the ho-
meopathic Boston University medical faculty in 1873.267  
 Women’s Hospital survived and thrived as leading teaching institution for women in Boston 
and as a pioneering institution for providing gynecological, obstetric, and pediatric care in a set-
ting run by women for women. Women’s Hospital and St. Elizabeth’s were the only hospitals in 
Boston that allowed gynecological surgery before 1880.268 One of Zakrzewska’s principal assis-
tants was Dr. Anita Tyng, a women turned down for admission by Harvard Medical School.269 
Noted anti-abortion crusader Horatio Robinson Storer was the only male physician appointed to 
the staff of the Women’s Hospital during the nineteenth century—in fact until 1958, barely a 
decade before Women’s Hospital closed.270 
 Opposition to women entering the formal medical profession was strong in the United States 
from the beginning. Dr. Charles Meigs led the early attack with the observation, during a lecture 
to medical students, that women have “a head almost too small for intellect but just big enough 
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for love.”271 This shocking comment reflected the widespread nineteenth century view, based in 
part on the then recent discovery that women’s brains were, on average, measurably smaller than 
men’s, that women were incapable of higher education.272 Also widespread at the time was the 
notion that women were predisposed to mental disorders because of their periodic menses, espe-
cially if they avoided becoming pregnant, leading to criticism of higher education for women as 
posing a threat to their health or to the health of their children.273 Dr. William Warren Potter ex-
pressed a common thought in these words: “Why spoil a good mother by making an ordinary 
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grammarian?”274 Dr. Withers Moore summed up this attitude with his observation that “women 
are made and meant to be not men, but the mothers of men.”275 Apparently confirming such atti-
tudes was the fact that during the nineteenth century fewer than five percent of white women in 
the United States worked outside the home after marriage.276 Most male medical authorities of 
the time shared the opinion that women were physiologically unsuited to be physicians.277 
 Feminist leaders of the time hotly contested such claims. One of the cleverer ripostes to the 
claim that women would be rendered unfit for marriage and motherhood by education was to 
point out that too many women were not adequately prepared to become mothers. As Helen 
Cameron Parker wrote: 
Society has seen and said—“the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world, and it is therefore 
a moral necessity that women should receive the best intellectual training which the State 
can give;”… Is it a small matter to the nation that each day scores of women become wives 
without one idea of the true duties of a wife, of the awful responsibility of a mother,…. 
Would ignorance be tolerated in any other profession?278 
 To a degree, social institutions developed to respond to this argument, but separately from 
the general education system. A large industry emerged to provide instruction to women on the 
proper performance of their social roles—mostly through public lectures and books.279 The sepa-
ration of this program of instruction from the general education establishment served to protect 
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against arguments that women were unfit to develop their intellects. As a result, throughout the 
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the prejudice against women becoming 
doctors prevailed without serious challenge within the medical establishment. 
 Only a few male doctors who had female associates came to accept the ability and right of 
women generally to become doctors.280 This is hardly surprising considering the prevailing sen-
timents of female frailty and of the limited functions in life appropriate to the female intellect 
pervasive throughout much of human history, and particularly in the nineteenth century. Even at 
Oberlin College, the first co-educational institution in the United States, the strong emphasis on 
maintaining gender roles extended to requiring “coeds” to clean the rooms of male students,281 
while they were prohibited from reading novels for fear that such an activity would threaten their 
chastity.282 So widely shared was the notion that women were generally not capable of serving as 
physicians that the leading woman physicians of the time, including those at Women’s Hospital, 
seldom publicly opposed the prevailing wisdom. Public opposition to the notion of feminine in-
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capacity to be educated generally or as physicians was expressed by various feminists,283 but sel-
dom by women physicians—or by women lawyers, either.284  
 One of the few female physicians to dispute publicly the claims about women’s natural fit-
ness to become doctors was Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi, but she did so purely in terms of disputing 
whether menstruation periodically incapacitated them physically or intellectually.285 The general 
silence even of women physicians on whether women in general had the intellectual capacity to 
become educated tells much about the temper of the times even if one concludes that the women 
failed to respond solely because they considered it impolitic.286 Although today we see such sen-
timents as absurd, just such ideas were expressed regarding university education for women gen-
erally as recently as 1962.287 There were, of course, numerous women in the later nineteenth cen-
tury who proved themselves fit to become physicians, lawyers, soldiers, and virtually any other 
profession open to men. Historian Mary Walsh surmised that the reason so many male physi-
cians denigrated the abilities of female physicians was simply to eliminate competition from a 
quarter likely to be able to appeal with particular effectiveness to the clientele for gynecological 
services.288 If the claimed attraction of women patients to women physicians were real, it would 
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have been devastating to men physicians—women were a clear majority of the patients in the 
nineteenth century.289 And we do find that Dr. Horatio Robinson Storer—the favorite whipping 
boy of modern feminist historians—did strenuously attack claims that women were best treated 
by women, but then so did Dr. Marie Zakrzewska.290  
 Women physicians were not welcomed by their male counterparts, but the women physi-
cians did achieve considerable success in entering the allopathic (and homeopathic) medical pro-
fession despite the male opposition.291 By 1890, there were 13 allopathic medical schools (and 
one homeopathic medical school) specifically for women, and women, after prolonged and bitter 
struggles, were beginning to gain admission to the formerly all-male medical schools.292 In that 
same year, 18 percent of the physicians in Boston were women, and they maintained their own 
hospital and their own medical school.293 In 1890 there were more woman doctors in Boston 
alone (210) than there were woman lawyers in the entire United States (200).294 By 1893, women 
were 19 percent of the students at the University of Michigan Medical School, 31 percent of the 
students enrolled at the Kansas Medical College, and 10 percent or more of the students at an-
other 16 “regular” medical colleges across the United States.295 The number of women physi-
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cians in the United States was also impressive by international standards. For example, there 
were only 95 woman physicians in France in 1900 compared to 7,387 in the United States 
(counting only those with medical degrees).296 The situation in England was even more dismal 
than in France. Historian Mary Walsh’s report that there were then some 258 women physicians 
in England in 1900 ignores the fact that four-fifths of the woman physicians registered in Eng-
land were then practicing in India!297  
 Eventually the criticism of women as physicians succeeded, but not until they gained admis-
sion to coeducational medical schools. The admission of women to coeducational medical 
schools was the death-knell for the women’s medical schools. Only three—Woman’s Medical 
College in Baltimore, New York Woman’s Medical College in New York City, and Woman’s 
Medical College of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia—survived after 1903.298 Still, as late as 1926, 
75 percent of the women in the American College of Surgeons had graduated from women’s 
medical colleges.299 Unfortunately, the apparent acceptance of women into the male medical 
schools proved illusory, and after 1910 women students were admitted to the coeducational 
schools only in sharply reduced numbers (in some cases they were excluded altogether).300 By 
1914, nationally only four percent of all medical students were women.301 As a result, women 
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reached a peak of six percent of all physicians in the United States in 1910.302 In fact, there were 
fewer women physicians in Boston in 1970 than in 1900.303 The total number of woman physi-
cians in the whole of the United States in 1910 (9,015) declined and was not equaled again until 
1950.304 Even as late as 1970, only eight percent of all physicians in the United States were 
women, as were 13 percent of the medical students in that year.305 Black women in particular 
found it nearly impossible to enter the profession, particularly after the turn of the century.306  
 In short, after 1910 women were largely excluded from the medical profession except in the 
role of nurses. Only after 1970 did the number of women in medical schools begin to grow sig-
nificantly, soon exceeding the numbers at the end of the nineteenth century.307 Yet at no time in 
this process of exclusion did opposition to the claim that women were by their nature incapable 
of being physicians correlate with support for abortion.308 
 Women physicians stood at a special place in the history of the nineteenth century abortion 
statutes, being at the intersection of the two major groups most interested in the practice and le-
gality of abortion. Yet given that the predominant attitudes among both women (or at least 
among feminist leaders—who alone have left extensive records of their thought) and physicians 
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was decidedly hostile to abortion, we should not be surprised to discover that women physicians 
in the nineteenth century were also outspoken supporters of the criminality of abortion. The hos-
tility of women physicians towards abortion began with Elizabeth Blackwell, the first formally 
licensed woman physician in the United States.309 Blackwell abhorred abortion, although the evi-
dence of her attitude is confined to private letters.310  
 Women physicians were among the strongest crusaders against abortion and provided us 
with some of the most rigorous defenses of the unborn child’s right to life. For example, Dr. 
Charlotte Denman Lozier, a professor at the New York City Medical College for Women, won 
acclaim both in the popular press and in the feminist press for her personal crusade against abor-
tion. Her crusade was cut short by an untimely death at the age of 26 in 1870. She was eulogized 
in an obituary published in The Revolution.311 The Revolution was a leading feminist journal of 
the time, owned by Susan B. Anthony and edited by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Parker Pills-
bury.312 The obituary was written by Paulina Wright Davis, an ardent advocate of women’s 
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rights who on another occasion chose to describe marriage as “legalized prostitution.”313 This 
attitude did not deter Ms. Davis, in her obituary of Dr. Lozier, from giving fulsome praise to the 
deceased young doctor’s efforts of to suppress abortion. 
 The position taken by virtually all women physicians is illustrated by this passage from a 
book by Dr. Alice Bunker Stockham: 
When the female germ and male sperm unite, then is the inception of a new life; all that 
goes to make up a human being—body, mind, and spirit, must be contained in embryo 
within this minute organism. Life must be present from the very moment of conception. 
If there was not life there could not be conception. At what other period of a human be-
ing’s existence, either pre-natal or post-natal, could the union of soul and body take 
place? Is it not plain that the violent or forcible removal of it from the citadel of life, is 
its premature death, and hence the act can be denominated by no more mild term than 
murder, and whoever performs that act, or is accessory to it, guilty of the crime of all 
crimes?314 
 Stockham was not some simpering woman currying favor with male practitioners. Stockham 
was a pioneer in women’s health. She enjoyed inventing a new vocabulary to suggest that her 
ideas were not simply derived from past or current popular ideas, and she was not afraid to out-
rage public opinion. Thus Stockham was one of the earliest public advocates of family plan-
ning.315 The term she invented for her preferred method of contraception was “karezza,” by 
which she meant coitus reservatus—intercourse without male ejaculation.316  
 The book that I have quoted for Stockham’s attitude toward abortion was yet another work 
in which she sought to challenge conventional thinking. Even its title, Tokology: A Book for 
Every Woman, would be a challenge to many potential readers. Nonetheless, that book was not 
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merely a tract read by a few other physicians. As its title indicates, the book was intended for lay 
readers, and it enjoyed great popularity. The book went through 45 editions between its publica-
tion in 1883 and 1897—an average of better than three per year.317  
 Dr. Stockham’s analysis illustrated the sharp contrast—even among women who had had 
abortions—between the horror feminists expressed for abortion and their accepting attitude to-
wards contraception.318 This contrast suggests that their attitude toward abortion was focused on 
abortion rather than on either sex or men. This conclusion is also supported by strong evidence 
that women themselves were the primary movers in the process of medicalizing birth.319 Dr. 
Jennie Oreman, a contemporary of Stockham, expressed similar views in a journal targeted at 
women readers.320 Dr. Anne Densmore lectured to the same effect a generation earlier.321 In 
1894, Dr. Mary Dixon Jones, perhaps the most prominent woman physician in Brooklyn (then a 
large and separate city), also eloquently and passionately condemned abortion.322 
 Feminist historians have responded to this reality by arguing that women physicians feared 
association with abortion because of their vulnerability to criticism by men physicians.323 This 
seems unlikely given the general pattern of hostility to abortion by nineteenth century femi-
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nists—women who did not shy away from advocating the outrageous. Indeed, as we have seen, 
Stockham’s denunciations of abortion were contained in writings that were medically and sex-
ully radical. Arguments that these women physicians were simply afraid of criticism over abor-
tion are not credible. Moreover, if these arguments are credible, they undercut the argument that 
abortion was socially acceptable: if abortion were considered socially acceptable, men physi-
cians could not deploy accusations of support for abortion to discredit women physicians with 
the general public. 
 Dr. Horatio Robinson Storer, he of the Women’s Hospital staff, has been accused of blaming 
the rise in abortions on the emergence of women physicians in the later nineteenth-century. 
Storer never said this, forcing his accusers to claim that he did so by innuendo.324 Neither he nor 
others campaigning against abortion who also criticized the possibility of women becoming phy-
sicians made any rhetorical use of abortion against the women doctors. Nothing could more elo-
quently indicate the rarity of support for the practice of abortion among female physicians. 
DID FEMINIST OPPOSITION TO ABORTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
[K]nowledge and truth are always fragmentary. 
—Allan Hutchinson325 
 There remains the question of whether the feminist opposition to abortion was of any real 
significance given the “allopathic conspiracy” that we are told was the real force behind the in-
creasingly stringent abortion statutes of the nineteenth century. This is akin to asking whether 
environmentalists or business interests better explain why modern environmental regulations ex-
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ist, or have taken one particular form rather than another. The answer is, of course, that both are 
responsible to some degree, and that often the precise influences are difficult to assess—
particularly as neither group is monolithic and each group sometimes finds closer allies in the 
other group than among its “like kind.” Going back to the nineteenth century to compare the ef-
fects of feminist opposition to abortion with medical or other opposition to abortion is even more 
uncertain because, by and large each, of these groups (and many others) were on the same side.  
 We are also somewhat befuddled by the understandable tendency of modern historians to 
anachronism. We tend to think of the organized medical profession and the organized legal pro-
fession as having enormous and disproportionate influence back then if we perceive them as 
wielding such influence today. Whatever may be the truth today, those professions had no such 
influence through much of the nineteenth century. We have already noted the failure of the allo-
pathic medical societies to block legislative recognition of competing medical organizations or 
professions in the face of Jacksonian democracy.326 In the next chapter, we shall examine the 
similar deprofessionalization of the Bar.327 The disorganization of the Bar was particularly pro-
nounced; the American Bar Association was not even organized until 1878—a full generation 
after the organization of the American Medical Association in the 1850s—and it was decades 
before it had any real political influence.328 In contrast, the nineteenth-century feminists were 
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highly organized and were successful in such areas as the reform of property regimes, of divorce, 
and (in some states) of the franchise.329 
 We need not rely solely on inferences about the legislative clout of these several groups. In 
at least one political fight, the doctors and the feminists were on opposite sides—and the femi-
nists won. In the 1870s, many members of the American Medical Association were strong sup-
porters of the legalization of prostitution on the state and local level, arguing that legalization 
would allow for mandatory health inspections as well as providing some measure of protection 
against the exploitation and abuse that were common in that trade.330 Dr. J. Marion Sims, presi-
dent of the American Medical Association in 1876 and notorious practitioner of dubious gyneco-
logical surgery, made the legalization and regulation of prostitution the theme of his year at the 
head of the organization.331 In the fight to legalize prostitution, the physicians found themselves 
largely alone, and they lost.  
 Feminists, organized in the “social purity” crusade, were strongly opposed to the legaliza-
tion of prostitution, even introducing the term “white slavery” in an effort to link their crusade to 
the recently successful abolition movement.332 Historian Jean Donnison suggests that the “social 
purity” movement, with its escalating intense attention to the hitherto largely neglected issue of 
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prostitution, reflected a rising incidence of prostitution fueled by the increasing difficulty of 
women to find work outside the home.333 Whatever the causes of the feminist concern about 
prostitution, nearly everywhere the proposed statutes or ordinances were defeated, and in St. 
Louis, where such an ordinance was enacted in 1870, the social purists succeeded in obtaining its 
repeal in 1874.334 The feminists, of course, were not alone in their effort. Among their allies was 
Anthony Comstock, who was neither a physician nor a lawyer.335 In fact, nineteenth century 
feminists were strong supporters of the Comstockery that today’s feminists love to decry,336 
while Comstock himself devoted only a brief period in his long career crusading against the 
vices of others to pursuing abortionists.337 When the doctors, the feminists, and the lawyers (to-
gether with the clergy, journalists, and others) joined together to fight the emerging practice of 
abortion, they were nearly irresistible. 
 Ultimately, we might never be able to sort out whether feminist opposition to abortion was a 
significant factor in bringing about the enactment of the abortion statutes. In one area, the influ-
ence of the men and the women physicians strongly coincided, and that coincidence could indeed 
have been critical to the success of the legislative effort regarding abortion. Rather than express-
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ing some sort of womanly solidarity with midwives, women physicians were in the forefront of 
the movement to eliminate midwives, charging midwives with being unsanitary and inadequately 
trained.338 Elisabeth Crowell, a nurse, was also one of the persons who most vehemently de-
nounced the word “midwife” as virtually synonymous with “abortionist.”339 Women physicians 
and nurses might have been especially sensitive to competition from midwives, so their criticism 
might indeed have been nothing more than an effort to eliminate competitors from the market 
place.340 Still, this hardly marks such an effort as a “male conspiracy.”341  
 The women physicians and nurses involved in this effort saw themselves as protecting other 
women from the incompetence and unsanitary practices of midwives rather than as putting these 
other women more firmly under the control of men.342 Acting from this perspective, non-
professional women’s organizations like the Welfare League and the Women’s City Club joined 
the call for suppressing abortion and regulating midwifery in turn of the century Chicago.343 No 
wonder historians of midwifery do not explain the suppression of midwifery as a male conspir-
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acy, but in terms of class, ethnicity, and professional interest.344 The charges of male conspiracy 
come only from historians of abortion.345 Neither set of historians bother to explain, however, 
how the charges of incompetence or worse could be sustained in a public forum in which, at the 
beginning at least, nearly every women hearing the claims would have had personal experience 
with a midwife, if there was no substance whatsoever to the charges—as some historians would 
apparently have us believe. 
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